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This document is an analysis of the reasons as to why the HNS Convention, whose significance for 
the maritime society is also demonstrated, has not become yet in force. Through a comparative 
presentation of the Convention with other conventions, the difficulties of application and criticisms 
are developed as well as the propositions of solutions that can accelerate the process of ratification 
and reduce controversies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Transport of hazardous substances is a very dangerous activity. If a spill happens, the 
aftermath can be disastrous for human beings and the environment. Fortunately, no major 
catastrophe comparable to The Erika has happened yet but there have been some alarming 
incidents.  
 
For example, in February 1990, in Los Angeles, while charging, longshoremen complained 
about strong odours emanating from the cargo. The cargo was trifluoropropane that is a 
non-toxic but highly explosive gas. As a precaution, the harbour was closed. However 
notifications of possible injury were received. 
 
In December 1993, The Sherbro lost in a storm 91 containers of nitrocellulose and 
pesticides near Normandy. The cargo spread on the shore and was collected without major 
damage. 
 
In December 1999, 20,000 detonators were lost by the Mary H and hundreds of kilometres 
of beaches in France are rendered inaccessible.  
 
The 31st October 2000, The Ievoli Sun sank. It was transporting styrene (3,998 tonnes), 
isopropyl alcohol (996 tonnes) and methyl ethyl ketone (1, 027 tonnes). Styrene is a 
chemical product that presents risks for human health. It has the appearance of a water-
white liquid that evaporates easily but once mixed with other components, it emits a strong 
odour and can be explosive. With water it changes into white strands. It is irritating for the 
respiratory system and can provoke different kinds of lesions. It is also carcinogenic. 
Special care had to be taken for the cleaning up of the shore. In this case, 6 claims have 
been made for a total of  11,661,830 euros. 
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More recent cases happened all over the world with more or less disastrous consequences1. 
 
However the elaboration of the “Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention” 
(hereafter HNS Convention) was not done directly after the happening of a disaster 
contrary to the “International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
1969/1992” (hereafter CLC 1992) and “Fund Convention 1971/1992”, drafted just after 
The Torrey Canyon catastrophe. It was nevertheless inspired by the system dealing with oil 
pollution liability, although the “Convention on Civil Liability for Operators of Nuclear 
Ships”, first system designed for compensation of damages caused by hazardous 
substances, pre-existed. 
 
The HNS Convention seeks to provide a uniform international regime for the determination 
of questions related to liability and compensation to the victims suffering damages caused 
by spills at sea of hazardous and noxious substances. 
 
The Convention is based on a two-third system comparable with the one established under 
the CLC 1992 and the Fund Convention.  
 
Damage is defined as loss of life or personal injury, loss of or damage to property outside 
the ship, loss or damage by contamination of the environment, costs of preventive measures 
and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures2.  
 
The Convention also provides a list of what should be considered as hazardous and noxious 
substances3. This list refers itself to other existing lists. Those substances include both bulk 
                                                   
1 For example, Jolly Rubina in South Africa (2002), Accord in China (2002), Tasman Spirit in Pakistan (2003), 
Bow Mariner in the USA (2004), Vicuna  in Brazil (2004), Kasco in Vietnam (2005), GG Chemist in China (2005), 
Samho Brother in Taiwan (2005) and Ece in France (2006). 
2 HNSC 1996 article 1-6. 
3 HNSC 1996 article 1-5. ).  “Hazardous and noxious substances” are defined as oils defined by MARPOL 73/78, 
which are those oils not within the scope of CLC, noxious liquid substances defined in Annex II of MARPOL 
73/78, dangerous liquid substances carried in bulk listed in Chapter 17 of the International Code for the 
Constuction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk 1983, dangerous, hazardous and 
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cargoes and packaged goods. They can be solids or liquids. The Convention includes 
liquefied gases (LNG or LPG) but excludes pollution damage as defined in the CLC 1992 
and Fund Conventions to avoid an overlap of the two regimes. Some bulk solids as coal 
and iron ore are excluded because they represent a low level of hazard. Finally, the list 
refers to hundreds of materials.  
 
Limitation of liability is possible for the registered shipowner on whom strict liability is 
channelled. In addition, he must subscribe to a compulsory insurance to cover his liability 
under the Convention. If the damage exceeds the limitation amount, the HNS Fund would 
provide a second tier of compensation. This Fund is financed by cargo interests. It would 
also pay in case no liability is found or if the owner is incapable to pay. Compensation is 
possible for up to 250 million SDR when hazardous and noxious substances caused 
damage. 
 
The Convention shall enter into force 18 months after that 12 States have accepted it. 
Amongst those 12 States, four must have no less than two million units of gross tonnage. 
Entities in these States who would be responsible to pay contributions to the general 
account must have received a total quantity of at least 40 million tonnes of contributing 
cargo in the preceding calendar year4.  
 
The 30th September 1997, the Convention was signed with reservation of ratification by 
eight states5. Today, eight States6 have ratified the Convention and only two of them have 
at least two million units of gross tonnage (Cyprus and Russia). As a consequence, it is not 
in force yet. It would be in force once ratified by European Union members through the 
“third Erika package” expected in 2008. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
harmful substances, materials and articles in packaged form covered by the International Maritime Dangerous 
Goods Code (IMDG Code), liquefied gases, etc.” 
4 HNSC 1996 article 46-1. 
5 Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Sweden. 
6 Angola, Saint-Kitts-and-Nevis, Cyprus, Samoa, Russia, Slovenia, Morocco and Tonga. 
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Its compensation system is complex but comparable to the one provided for oil pollution. 
Nevertheless, it is a fair regime that splits the risks of transport of dangerous goods 
between those who benefit from it.  
 
It is undoubtedly necessary that this Convention is ratified as fast as possible7 since it was 
drafted more than a decade ago. This need can be demonstrated by an analysis of the legal 
international background of the Convention (2). 
 
Why does it take so long? Several reasons can be found. Some concern the substance of the 
Convention: its complexity and its scope make it more difficult to apply than the ones on 
oil pollution. We will therefore analyse and compare the HNS, CLC 1992, and Bunker Oil 
Pollution conventions (3).  
 
Other reasons (4) concern either procedural aspects as within the European Union (4.1.) or 
political behaviour such as the one in the United States (4.2.). 
                                                   
7 William O’Neil, secretary-general of IMO : « it is unsatisfactory that the world should have to wait for years and 
years for the required number of ratifications to bring a convention in force.” 
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2.  The HNS Convention’s legal international background 
 
The need to provide an international convention regulating the transport of hazardous and 
noxious substances has been developed progressively (2.1) since no major accidents 
involving hazardous substances had created political incitements to draft such a 
convention. Nevertheless, such a convention appeared to be necessary in order to establish 
a uniform regime, to ameliorate the current situation in each country, as shown afterwards 
with the example of the Norwegian legislation (2.2), and to feel the gaps in the field or 
international regulations about transport of polluting cargo (2.3). 
 
2.1 History 
 
2.1.1 From the first negotiation to the conclusion of the HNS Convention 
 
The HNS Convention is the first convention that was not issued directly after a major 
catastrophe. It was created to complement the conventions about liability for oil pollution. 
Potentially, pollution by hazardous and noxious goods can be as dangerous for human life 
and environment as pollution by oil spills. 
 
In 1975, preparatory works started between the IMO States after that a questionnaire had 
been sent to member States to gather their needs and ideas in 1974. Nevertheless, slow 
progress was made because several interests were in conflict. The shipowners wanted a 
shared responsibility between the shipowner and the cargo owners. This view was 
supported by Japan. The cargo owners wanted an exclusive liability on the owner of the 
vessel and were helped by Australia. 
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The scope of application of the Convention was also problematic: should it cover bulk 
cargo only or also packaged cargo? Bulk cargo is more likely to cause environmental 
disaster. An extension of the Convention to include packaged cargo would increase 
problems to organize contributions from cargo interests. 
 
The idea of extending the CLC 1969 was proposed but rejected later on. 
 
In 1984, no consensus was found even if the general inclination privileged the same type of 
liability than the one found for oil pollution, except the carriers. They declared themselves 
to be hostile towards the Convention, considering the preventive measures8 already in place 
and the economic context, different from the one for oil transportation. Consequently, the 
project of Convention was about to be abandoned; even the CMI distanced itself from the 
project. 
 
However the European Union declared that it would draft a regulation on that matter 
whether no international convention was adopted. 
 
The IMO, threatened by this latter project, had to ascertain its position of generator of 
maritime conventions by adopting a new resolution as fast as possible. This initiative was 
welcomed by European governments which preferred the adoption of a universal regime of 
responsibility rather than a regional legislation which would not be as satisfactory in 
maritime matter. 
 
It is in this new political context that diplomatic negotiations took place in March 1996. 
Each government felt a need of success and the HNS Convention was signed, enforcing the 
IMO’s authority. The Convention was finalized the 3rd May 1996.  
                                                   
8 Françoise Odier La Convention sur la Responsabilité et l’Indemnisation pour les Dommages Liés au Transport 
par Mer de Substances Nocives et Potentiellement Dangereuses (Convention HNS) Annuaire du Droit de la Mer 
1996, Institut du Droit Economique de la Mer, Pedone, p. 94 
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2.1.2 The criticisms 
 
As we have seen, the main argument opposed to the HNS Convention was its complexity. 
The Convention is based on the CLC/IOPC regime whereas chemicals are substantially 
different from oil. The cargo sizes are smaller. Chemicals are volatile, rapidly dissolve or 
degrade. Moreover the safety record of vessels transporting chemicals by sea is good9. 
Chemical tankers and other risky vessels were already subject to preventive rules. 
 
Shipowners were reluctant towards the HNS Convention because it implies an increased 
financial liability. The threshold of liability borne by shipowners would be substantially 
increased and in addition, they will have to subscribe compulsory insurance. The number of 
shipowners who will be concerned by these fees augmentation is larger because the goods 
involved are not only transported in bulk but also in packaged forms. Would the scheme 
have only covered bulk transport, the HNS Convention would be applicable to a limited 
number of specialised ships. HNS in packaged form may be carried by any cargo ship. So 
even small carriage-capacity vessels should pay a high level of compensation and nearly all 
vessels would be covered by the liability scheme.  
 
The cargo owners complained about the increase of their financial burden. They would 
have to participate to compensation of damages and bear an administrative burden to 
report. It could provoke a distortion of competition due to the heterogeneity of 
compensation rules at an international level. They were also afraid to take away the 
shipowners’ sense of responsibility and to become the guarantor for the respect of safety 
standard on what they have no control. 
 
Insurance industry was sceptical about the market capacity to take into consideration the 
HNS risk without having the possibility to link it with the existing indemnity regimes. 
                                                   
9 Proposals on Chemical Accidents at Sea Face Strong Opposition, International Petrochemical Report, May 1984. 
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As for the States, they should have an incentive to implement a convention. This incentive 
can be materialised in financial or other kinds of benefices. States will be more reluctant to 
implement a convention when this convention asks for the establishment of an 
administrative support manned by highly paid civil servants. The HNS Convention requires 
States to monitor and report the movement of cargoes falling into the category of hazardous 
and noxious substances. 
 
Despite the controversies around the HNS Convention and its difficult drafting process, it 
is clear that it would ameliorate the situation as it is today in nearly all countries as it can be 
demonstrated by having a closer look at the current regime in Norway. 
 
2.2 The current regime in Norway: application of the Maritime Code 1994. 
 
Even though the HNS Convention has not been yet ratified, a procedure to facilitate 
implementation has already been incorporated into the United Kingdom’s legislation. It 
was inserted into the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997 under section 14 
which came into force on 17 July 1997. The rapidity shown by the United Kingdom was 
due to the unsatisfactory character of the current regulation of the carriage of hazardous 
and noxious substances by sea. 
 
In Norway, no incorporation has been made yet but, after the entry into force of the HNS 
Convention, the Maritime Code (hereafter NMC 1994) will devote its Chapter 11 to the 
liability and compensation regime for damage caused by spills at sea of hazardous and 
noxious substances. 
 
Currently, the regime of general liability of the carrier is applicable. There is no distinction 
pursuant to the nature of the goods causing damage10. Special provisions about liability 
                                                   
10 NMC 1994 Chapters 7 and 9. 
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caused by dangerous goods are only found in order to make the sender liable towards the 
carrier and sub-carrier11. 
 
The problem is when the sender has rendered himself responsible towards the carrier by not 
informing the carrier of the dangerous nature of the goods and an incident, which would be 
covered by the HNS Convention, happened including damages to third parties. 
 
The starting point for the third party would be to prove the shipowner’s negligence, the 
causation between the negligence and the damages, and the sufficient proximity. At that 
point, two possibilities can be distinguished: (i) damages caused by a negligent act or 
omission of the shipowner or the one for whom he is responsible under NMC 1994, section 
151 in the management of the ship and (ii) damages due to an inadequate stowage of the 
goods. 
 
In the first part of the alternative, the shipowner is negligent. However, a problem arises 
concerning the proximity of the damages. Unaware of the nature of the goods, the 
shipowner could not have foreseen the extent of the damage or even its existence. Damages 
could be caused by the inherent particularities of the goods. 
 
In the second part of the alternative, damages are caused by an inadequate stowage 
considering the nature of the goods. In this case, the shipowner is not negligent because he 
was not aware that special care was required for this type of goods. 
 
In those two cases, it would be difficult for third party to claim for the shipowner’s 
liability. The logic would be to hold responsible the actual tortfeasor, the sender, who has 
acted negligently by not complying himself to the requirements of NMC 1994 section 257. 
But difficulties as identification of the sender, sufficient insurance, sufficient security and 
even insolvency of the sender can arise. The shipowner is normally easy to identify, can 
subscribe insurance and provide security in the ship. 
                                                   
11 NMC 1994 section 291. 
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As a conclusion, the current system is not enough protective for damage to third parties in 
case of damage caused by spills of hazardous and noxious substances at sea. 
 
There is an existing need to implement the HNS Convention which would fulfil a gap in 
the regulations of both the hazardous materials trade and the liability and compensation 
mechanisms. 
 
2.3 Hazardous materials trade 
 
The HNS Convention is an item in a set of international conventions and protocols that 
aims at regulating the hazardous materials trade. Each regulates a specific aspect of the 
hazardous materials trade without overlapping each other’s scope. 
 
2.3.1 Convention on Civil liability for Damage caused during carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels  
 
The “Convention on Civil liability for Damage caused during carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels” (thereafter CRTD) is the geographical 
complement of the HNS Convention which concerns maritime transportation. The CRTD 
was prepared by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe but other countries 
can become signatories. It was opened to signatures in 1990 but it is not in force yet. 
 
The CRTD retains a strict liability with limited liability of the operators12. The responsible 
person is presumed to be the registered owner or the owner if no registration exists. 
 
                                                   
12 CRTD article 1-8. 
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The idea proposed by the carriers of a joint liability between shippers and carriers was 
found unworkable and impractical because most of governments think that joint and 
several liability is too complex. But by way of exceptions, the unfairness of placing all 
responsibilities on the carrier has been avoided. When other persons are liable, the 
Convention renders the consignor or consignee liable for accidents caused during the 
loading and unloading without the carrier’s participation. There is also joint and several 
liability when both the carrier and another person are involved in loading and unloading13. 
 
Liability is limited14 but governments can adopt higher limitation or unlimited liability15. 
CRTD provides for compulsory insurance16 for the carrier and the person controlling the 
vehicle at the time of accident. Claims for compensation may be addressed directly to the 
insurers.  
 
The proposition to supply a fund of compensation in case the liability limits would be 
exceeded did not gain the support from the majority of States. 
 
2.3.2 Liability for waste trade 
 
Hazardous waste is not explicitly excluded of the scope of application of the HNS 
Convention. However, waste trade is extensively regulated both at the International and 
European Community level. According to the principle of the most special prevails on the 
general, the HNS Convention should not been applicable when the others regulations 
criteria are fulfilled. 
   
The “Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal”17 (hereafter Protocol to Basel 
                                                   
13 CRTD article 6. 
14 CRTD article 9. 
15 CRTD article 24. 
16 CRTD article 13. 
17 December 10, 1999. 
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Convention18) was made to ascertain a comprehensive regime of adequate compensation 
when cross-border movements of waste are involved. The system is based on notification 
and consent from the importing country before waste is transported to that country. 
 
The notifier of waste is strictly liable when damage occur during the transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes, including illegal traffic, from the moment the wastes are 
loaded at the port of export19. Liability ceases when the disposer takes possession of 
wastes. Strict liability is limited and compulsory insurance must be taken. 
 
For other persons causing damage, fault liability would be applicable without limitation. 
 
In the European Union, Regulation 259/93 deals with transport of hazardous waste. Under 
the Basel Convention and this Regulation, the European Union prohibits shipment of waste 
from OECD countries to non-OECD countries. However, the enforcement and control of 
this regulation are problematic as shown in the case of the Probo Koala in August 2006. In 
this case, the repumping of waste and their exportation from the Netherlands to Ivory Coast 
have been done in contradiction with the principles of R259/93. The shipment of liquid 
sludge containing hydrocarbons was unloaded in Ivory Coast and a total of 10 deaths, 69 
persons in hospital and more than 102,000 persons under medical treatment has been 
reported. 
 
2.3.3 Protocol on preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution 
Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000 (OPRC-HNS 
Protocol) 
 
The triptych prevention-compensation-sanction is assured by the combination of the 
OPRC-HNS Protocol and the HNS Convention. Indeed, the OPRC-HNS Protocol sets up a 
preventive regime for the transport by sea of hazardous and noxious substances. 
                                                   
18 March 22, 1989. 
19 Protocol article 3-1. 
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The OPRC-HNS Protocol entered into force on 14 June 2007, one year after ratification of 
fifteen States which are parties to the OPRC Convention. 
 
It aims to provide a global framework for international co-operation in combating major 
incidents or threats of marine pollution. Parties to the Protocol must establish measures 
dealing with pollution incidents in co-operation with other States. 
 
Ships are required to carry a shipboard pollution emergency plan to deal specifically with 
incidents involving hazardous and noxious substances. Nevertheless, the definition of 
hazardous and noxious substances differs from the definition chosen by the HNS 
Convention. 
 
Preventive measures aim to avoid accidents that could cause damages to the population or 
to the environment. However, it is always also preferable to implement rules on 
compensation and sanction as aimed in the HNS Convention. A compensation regime 
already exists but it is based on negligence liability. According to the shipowners, this 
regime is fair. All accidents by sea are not due to human’s fault and the risky nature of sea 
transportation. Nevertheless, victims will systematically retain the vessel as the responsible 
party. It is, therefore, necessary to establish a strict liability regime in case of damage by 
sea pollution. Protection of victims is the first and political goal of the HNS Convention. 
 
 
To sum up, there is a real need for the principle of the HNS Convention. The draft has been 
made on a known basis that has been improved. Logically, it should have already been 
ratified by a sufficient number of countries to be in force. But interested parties have 
developed some objections during the drafting process that handicapped the ratification by 
States. A practical comparison between the HNS Convention and the oil pollution 
conventions could assert the reasons of this slowness. 
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3. The HNS convention 1996 compared to the oil pollution convention and 
bunker oil convention 
 
The CLC 1992, Fund Convention 1971/1992, HNS Convention 1996 and Bunker Oil 
Convention 2001 represent the International Maritime Organization’s achievement for 
unification of the international law on liability and compensation in case of marine 
pollution.  
 
HNS Convention introduces a system of strict liability of the shipowner (3.1) under a 
system of compulsory insurance (3.2) and insurance certificates which is a copy of the CLC 
1992. But it is not possible to obtain sufficient cover through the shipowner’s liability 
alone. As a result the shipowner’s liability only forms the first tier of liability. The second 
tier is paid by cargo interests grouped in HNS Fund (3.3). The HNS Fund is basically 
similar to the approach taken under Fund Convention 1992. 
 
It seems that there should be no problem of implementation of a convention when it is 
modelled on another convention highly ratified; however a closer analysis to the HNS 
Convention shows some differences that can explain the reluctance of the shipping 
industry, the insurance companies and the cargo owners towards it. 
 
3.1  The shipowner’s liability system 
 
Chapter 2 of the HNS Convention deals with the liability of the shipowner. This scheme is 
now classical in Maritime Law: strict liability (3.1.1), channelling of liability (3.1.2) and 
limitation (3.1.3). 
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3.1.1 Liability system 
 
The chosen liability is a strict liability which provides a different evidential regime from 
the fault based liability (3.1.1.1). Without a mechanism of exemptions, this regime would 
have seemed unfair for the shipowner (3.1.1.2). 
 
3.1.1.1 Rationale underlying the choice of strict liability regime 
 
Under English law, the landmark case about strict liability is Rylands v. Fletcher20where 
the court held:  
 
“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purpose 
brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie 
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape”.21 
 
Where a hazardous activity is involved, the party who creates the risk and gains economical 
benefit from that activity should bear the risks. Strict liability is a liability based on risk and 
not on fault. 
 
As with the CLC 199222 and CRTD 198923, the shipowner, under the HNS Convention, is 
subject to a strict liability24. The rationale of this regime of liability answers to what was 
exposed in Rylands v. Fletcher.  
                                                   
20 [1868] Lloyd’s Rep. 3 H.L. 330. 
21 Under French Law, article 1384 paragraph 1 of the Code Civil introduces a general liability for ‘deeds of the 
things within one’s keeping’ which corresponds to the rule held in Rylands v. Fletcher. Moreover, there are many 
strict liability legislations both in public and private law for damage caused by things or caused by specific 
activities. 
22 CLC 1992, article 3. 
23 CRTD 1989, article 5. 
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Furthermore, strict liability is an advantage for innocent victims of pollution since they will 
not have to prove that the damage was caused by the shipowner. The victim only has to 
establish causation between the torts and the behaviour of the defendant but no direct link. 
It participates to satisfy victims of a maritime accident by accelerating the procedures of 
compensation. It is particularly interesting for the victims when the circumstances of the 
accidents are unclear and when it is not sure that the fault lays with the shipowner. Innocent 
victims do not need to acquire relevant information which either is inaccessible or needs 
considerable costs. The shipowner has the burden to prove that the exemptions are 
applicable. The liability regime under the HNS Convention uses in the same time the 
techniques of reversed burden of proof and of liability for risk. 
 
Finally, even if this reasoning is not unanimous, strict liability is a good way to improve 
prevention of marine pollution. It creates an incentive for the shipowners to comply with 
the safety standards. Shipowners will ensure that a certain degree of care in the 
management of the ship is maintained. In order to avoid liability, they have to decrease the 
probability of accidents. With this aim, they may develop stringent methods to ascertain the 
seaworthiness of the ship, take preventive and precautionary measures.  
 
3.1.1.2 The mechanism of the HNS strict liability 
 
CLC 1992 offers compensation only when damages are obvious. For HNS damage, this 
rule was not maintained because it would be problematic as the damage can appear 
progressively or a long time after the leaking of a hazardous or noxious substance 
happened25. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
24 HNSC 1996, article 7-1. 
25 The Minamata disease. A Japanese village was poisoned by mercury issued by a petrochemical plant. First 
symptoms were discovered in 1953 and the source of disease was identified in 1959. 3,000 persons were 
contaminated in the meantime. See http://rarediseases.about.com/od/rarediseases1/a/102304.htm. 
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The exemptions contained in CLC 199226 are found in the HNS Convention27. Shipowner 
will not be liable if the pollution is caused by an act of war or irresistible natural 
phenomenon, is wholly caused by an act or omission done with the intent to cause damage 
by a third party (act of terrorism), or by the negligence or wrongful act of a public 
authority. The exception is important in case of terrorism. If there is no liability, there will 
be no right of action against the insurers. The case of contributory negligence is also 
covered by the HNS Convention28. The shipowner may be partly or wholly exonerated 
from liability.  
 
But in addition to those exemptions, article 7-2 (d) provides an exemption peculiar to the 
nature of the transported goods.  
If the shipowner or its servants or agents did not know or could not reasonably know the 
hazardous and noxious nature of the goods shipped because the shipper or the one in charge 
to provide information failed to furnish it, the shipowner will not be automatically liable if 
the damage was wholly or partly caused by the substances or if the shipowner did not take 
an insurance as a result of the absence of information29. 
 
This is a novelty of the regime comparing to the liability system for oil pollution. It takes 
into account that hazardous and noxious substances may be transported in many forms and 
in small quantities but remains highly dangerous. In CRTD, the same exemption was 
provided because the transported goods are of the same nature. The shipowner is not liable 
when no information was provided pursuant to the current regime of carriage of goods by 
sea30. As we have seen previously, in Norway, the responsible tortfeasor would be the 
sender. Exceptionally, the receiver would be responsible when, for instance, he requests 
that the sender hides information about the goods to the carrier. There would be issues of 
identification of the sender, predictability, financial security, inadequate protection of the 
victims. 
                                                   
26 CLC 1992 article 3-2 a) b) and c). 
27 HNSC 1996 article 7-2. 
28 HNSC 1996 article 7-3. 
29 For practical examples, see 4.2.3 and 4.2.4. 
30 In Norway see NMC 1994 section 291. 
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However, with the HNS Convention, the HNS Fund will supply compensation31. Victims 
have a security in the fund which is an important advantage comparing to the situation as it 
is today. 
3.1.2 Channelling of liability 
 
The HNS Convention article 7-5 provides a system of channel of liability towards the 
registered owner. It is based on the CLC 1992. No claim can be made against the servants, 
agents, crew members, pilots, charterers, salvors etc. 
The channelling of liability is an interesting system for the injured party who is protected 
by an extensive strict liability imposed on the shipowner. The original CLC made the 
shipowner liable but did not protect other parties from suit except the agent and servants. In 
CLC 1992 and HNS Convention 1996, the protection was spread to other parties, except if 
the pollution was caused by the wilful misconduct of such a person. 
 
In addition, it is an advantage for the shipowner and other parties that may be responsible, 
as it is a simple system that avoid long courts proceedings, to know who should be held 
liable. Furthermore, it is predictable for the shipowner who will cover himself and it avoids 
problem of double insurance. 
 
Channelling of liability is a mechanism that is often used in conventions on compensation 
for pollution but it is not unanimously appreciated. After the Erika accident the channelling 
provisions of CLC 1992 was criticized by the European Community (EC) and it is one of 
the reasons for refusal of the United States (US) to sign the IMO’s pollution liability 
conventions32. The EC and the US think that excluding charterers, operators and managers 
from liability could serve as a disincentive to maintain high standards aboard ships and due 
care in their operations. 
                                                   
31 HNSC 1996 article 14-1 (a). 
32 George J. Mitchell, Preservation of State and Federal Authority Under the OPA 1990, 21 Environmental Law 
237 p. 240 (1991) 
 19
 
Under the Bunker Oil Convention, channelling of liability was not used. But more than an 
answer to the criticisms, this may be explained by the fact that there is no complementary 
convention comparable to the Fund Convention where compensation is given by the IOPC 
Fund. This fund exists for the HNS Convention and is called the HNS Fund.  
 
Not adopting a channelling mechanism raises also problems increased by the presence of 
insurance. For example, it can be difficult to determine the apportionment of liability 
between several parties and their insurers. It is difficult also to figure out how limits of 
liability are applicable.  
 
Furthermore, contrary to HNS Convention, Bunker Oil Convention does not protect salvors 
and cleanup contractors. Protection of those parties is called “responder immunity”. It is 
made to encourage taking measures to prevent or minimize pollution. Indeed, people 
undertaking those activities don’t bear the risk of liability claims. This protection responds 
to the underlying principles of the convention, to enforce prevention and protection against 
marine pollution. As such, several States, among others Australia and England, decided to 
add in their domestic legislation, responder immunity when implementing the Bunker Oil 
Convention. 
 
In compensation to the regime of strict liability and channelling of liability, the shipowner 
can limit his liability. 
 
3.1.3 Limitation of liability 
 
The exception to the right to limit liability is when the damage results by the personal act or 
omission of the shipowner who acted with knowledge that such a damage could result. This 
exception is found also in the CLC 1992 and Convention on Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims, 1976 (hereafter LLMC 1976). 
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3.1.3.1 The right to limit liability 
 
Shipowners’ liability is limited according to the gross tonnage of the vessel33.  
- When the vessel is up to 2,000 GT, the liability is limited to 10 million SDR. 
- When the vessel’ gross tonnage is between 2,001 and 50,000, in addition to the 10 million 
SDR, the liability is limited to 1,500 SDR/ton. 
- For vessels over, a supplement of 360 SDR/ton is added up to 100 million. 
 
For example34, if a chemical tanker of 15,000 GT with a cargo of benzene has an accident 
during berthing, the shipowner would be liable up to: 
 10 million + (15,000-2,000) x 1,500 = 29.5 million 
On the top of it the HNS Fund may have to pay up to the aggregate limit of 250 million. It 
will have to compensate the victims up to 220.5 million. 
 
Determination of the amounts was the result of a compromise between two opposite 
theories. Most of developed countries wanted a high level of limitation and even some 
European countries find difficult to maintain a right of limitation when incidents still 
happen. However developing countries were favourable to fix low limits for the first level 
not to handicap their national shipping industry. 
 
The first level of limitation was conceived as a result of the 71st session of the IMO Legal 
Committee in October 1994 where the United Kingdom demonstrated that a small ship 
carrying particularly harmful hazardous and noxious substances can cause more damages 
than a larger ship that transport less harmful cargo. In practice, very dangerous chemicals 
tend to be transported in small parcels on board of small ships. A vessel whose tonnage is 
of 500 GT would be deemed to have a tonnage of 2,000 tonnes for the purpose of the HNS 
Convention. This threshold is criticised because the owner of a vessel which practices 
                                                   
33 HNSC 1996, article 9.  
34 This scenario was provided by Joe Nichols, Workshop 25 and 26 May 2006, IMO London. 
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coastal navigation and carries dangerous goods have to conclude an insurance contract for 
10 million SDR. It is seldom that a vessel does not transport hazardous and noxious 
substances if we take into account the large scope of definition of such substances. It may 
have been practical to introduce a minimum quantity of cargo under which the HNS 
Convention is not applicable to avoid the risk of imposing a too heavy burden on small 
carriers. The HNS Convention provides the possibility for the States Parties to exclude its 
application if certain conditions are fulfilled35 
 
The difference of figures comparing to the CLC 199236 reflects the difference of the carried 
goods. Transportation of oil needs special equipment and vessel with a certain capacity 
contrary to the transportation of hazardous and noxious substances that can be done by 
unspecialised small vessels. As a result, the figures exceed those found in the CLC 1992. 
 
However it is regrettable that the limitations do not take more into account the nature of the 
transported goods and the notion of environmental risk. Not taking more into account the 
degree of danger to the environment is understandable in the measure that it would 
introduce more complexity due to the large number of goods covered by the HNS 
Convention. But, for example37, in the case of carriage of coal38, the shipowner liability 
will be limited to a higher level than in the case of carriage of a very noxious good whose 
weight is less significant.  
 
A precondition for the shipowner to limit its liability is to establish a limitation fund. He 
will be able to constitute the fund representing the limit of his liability in the court of the 
country in which the damage has been caused39. 
 
                                                   
35 HNSC article 5. Cf. 3.2.1.1. 
36 NMC 1994 section 194. 
37 This example is theoretical because coal is outside the scope of the HNSC (Karine Le Couviour The HNS 
Convention : A New Challenge for International Maritime Law, SIMPLY 2000, p.169 and ‘Athanasia Comninos’ 
[1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 277). 
38 Françoise Odier, La Convention sur la Responsabilité et l’Indemnisation pour les Dommages Liés au Transport 
par Mer de Substances Nocives et Potentiellement Dangereuses,  Annuaire du Droit de la Mer 1996 Tome 1 p.100.  
39 HNSC article 9-3. 
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The constitution of a fund corresponds with what is already found in the LLMC 1976. But 
a difference is that the shipowner does not have to wait for the issuance of a claim to 
constitute a fund. 
 
Constitution of a limitation fund prevents any person to exercise any action against other 
assets of the shipowner for his HNS claim and if the vessel has been arrested following the 
incident, it has to be released40.  
 
Shipowners’ insurers can also constitute a limitation fund. 
 
Both the CLC 1992 and the HNS Convention encourage the shipowner to take prompt 
actions in minimizing damage by providing that costs incurred by the shipowner can be 
ranked as other admissible claims against the shipowner’s own limitation fund41. It gives 
the shipowner a strong incentive to act promptly. This provision is not found in the 
Bunkers Convention or others limitation conventions. 
 
Considering the Vicuna case, the 15th November 2004, two explosions arose onboard of the 
Vicuna, a chemical tanker of 11,636 GT while discharging 14,000 tonnes of methanol in 
the port of Paranagua in Brazil. Two sailors were found dead and two lost. The vessel 
broke in two and approximately 400 tonnes of propulsion fuel were spilled. 
 
The pollution happened in a sensitive area where tourism and fishing are two important 
activities. Fishing and sale of aquacultural products were forbidden until disappearance of 
risks. Dolphins, turtles and birds were affected by pollution. 
 
In total, the wreck removal, pollution prevention and the clean up costs were up to 40 
million USD. Fines payable to the port, local environment agency and federal environment 
agency were more than 30 million USD. 
                                                   
40 HNSC article 10. 
41 HSNC article 9-8. We find the same incentive under article 14-2, where the owner can claim for compensation 
for his “expenses reasonably incurred or sacrifices reasonably made […] voluntarily”. 
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This incident should be covered by the Bunker Oil Convention and the HNS Convention. 
Distinction should be made between damages covered by each convention. However article 
1-6 of the HNS Convention stipulates that if damages caused by hazardous and noxious 
substances cannot be separated from damages resulting from other factors, they shall be 
deemed to be provoked by hazardous and noxious substances. Exception is made if the 
other factors are either covered by the CLC 1992 or radioactive material of class 7. There is 
nothing said about damages covered by the Bunker Oil Convention. Limitation of the 
shipowner’s liability would be less than 24.5 million SDR. 
 
3.1.3.2 The linkage problem 
 
Nowadays, limitation is fixed by each State. Most of them follow the Brussels Limitation 
Convention 1957 or the LLMC 1976 as it is in Norway. Limitation under these regimes is 
too low to cover a major pollution incident by hazardous and noxious substances.  
 
As a result, it was decided not to link the limits under the HNS Convention to existing 
limitation of liability. In fact, mainly insurers were in favour of such a linkage. They 
argued that linkage was necessary in order to make full use of the insurance market 
capacity.  
 
If there was a uniform limitation regime, there would be no linkage problem. In that 
hypothesis, the HNS Convention would only provide that a Contracting State can declare 
that the shipowner’s right to limit would be made, for example, under the LLMC 1976. If a 
HNS accident happens for which the LLMC 1976 Fund is not sufficient, the shipowner 
would have to provide a supplementary fund. 
 
However, difficulties appear, for instance, when a State is party to the HNS Convention 
and the unamended LLMC 1976. It will be unable to impose higher limits on the owner of 
a vessel with the flag of another State Party to the unamended LLMC 1976. So it was 
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necessary to provide the States the right to exclude application of the LLMC 1976 in order 
to apply the HNS Convention. The 1996 Protocol to the LLMC 1976 introduces that a State 
Party may exclude claims covered by the HNS Convention from the ambit of the 1996 
Protocol42. Higher limits are made applicable to pollution by hazardous and noxious 
substances. The United Kingdom adopted this reservation when adopting the Protocol 
1996. It is probable that any State Party to the LLMC 1976 and HNS Convention will ratify 
the Protocol 1996. 
 
3.1.3.3 Overview of the theoretical discussion about the necessity to limit the 
shipowner’s liability 
 
A part of the legal authors criticizes the possibility for the shipowner to limit his liability on 
the ground that legal basis justifying limitation of liability is difficult to find. 
.  
Gotthard Gauci argues that it is an anachronistic concept which is “an unjustly 
discriminatory attempt to subsidise the shipping industry at the expense of other 
interests”43. The suppression of limitation of liability corresponds to the principle that the 
one who damages the property of somebody else should pay for it or provide remedy that 
would constitute restitution in integrum. 
 
His argumentation is mainly based on the fact that limitation of liability can produce absurd 
results as for the Torrey Canyon case44 where the limitation was too low. He also 
demonstrates that unlimited liability would be insurable in opposition to what it is argued. 
Insurance companies would provide a ceiling upon which it will not pay and as a 
consequence only a marginal increase of price would be supported by the shipowning 
industry. For oil pollution damage and nuclear damage, unlimited liability has even been 
implemented by some judicial systems. For instance, Florida Statutes impose unlimited 
                                                   
42 Protocol to the LLMC 1976, 1996, article 7. 
43 Gauci, Limitation of Liability in Maritime Law ; an Anachronism ?”, 1995, Marine Policy Vol 19, N°1, 65, p. 66.  
44 281 F Sup. 228 (1968). 
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liability for damage to natural resources and property damages45. Californian Government 
Code § 8670.56.5 retains an unlimited and strict liability for damages incurred by leaking 
or discharging of oil in addition to requirement for financial security up to a specific 
amount. In the case of nuclear damage, Swiss Law46 also applies unlimited liability and 
compulsory insurance up to a certain amount. 
 
In The Bramley Moore, Lord Denning says: “I agree that there is not much room for justice 
in this rule; but limitation of liability is not a matter of justice. It is a rule of public policy 
which has its origin in history and its justification in convenience.”47 He does not condemn 
the system in its necessity contrary to Mr Justice Black, in Maryland Casualty v. Cushing48, 
where he declares that help provided by the Congress to shipowners was borne by the 
“injured seamen”. 
 
The Dean Rodière49 reviews the history of limitation of liability to establish whether it is 
still a necessary system. In the past, limitation was based on the ship. Once the ship was 
abandoned, liability of the shipowner stopped. The reason was that at each journey, the 
shipowner risked his vessel for the common benefice. This situation changed when counts 
could not be separated due to a rapprochement of journeys. 
 
At that moment the proposition was made to limit liability of the vessel up to its 
insurability. There can be a problem of substitution between responsibility and insurance. 
This substitution is criticised by Rodière as being contradictory with moral. Compensation 
by shipowners is not assessed according to shipowners’ fault but according to their 
activities and resources. They become guarantors. However is it not the result achieved by 
the system of strict liability more than by the existence of limitation and compulsory 
insurance?  
                                                   
45 Florida Statutes 376.12. 
46 RS 732.44 Loi sur la responsabilité civile en matière nucléaire, Chapitre 2 article 3 and article 11. 
47 Lord Denning M.R. In The Bramley Moore [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 429, p. 437. 
48 1953 AMC Vol XXXII 827, p. 859. 
49 René Rodière, La limitation de responsabilité du propriétaire de navires, passé, présent et avenir, Droit 
Maritime Français 1973. 
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In addition, a shipowner may be incited not to feel responsible. Shipowners are encouraged 
to think that they can always limit their liability and would have the incentive to break 
safety standards. They would pay for further insurance coverage in compensation. 
 
But what was the goal when drafting the HNS Convention? Was it not precisely that 
victims will get easily a compensation for the damages they suffered, financially secured 
by the shipowners, their insurers and the HNS Fund? Is there really a risk that preventive 
measures would not be respected? If shipowners don’t respect them, they will take the risk 
to damage their property, have to pay penalties, and compensate the third party victims for 
their losses without being able to limit their liability50. The same wording is found in 
LLMC 1976 and CLC 1992. However the exception to the right to limit liability is very 
seldom applied. As a consequence, it would be better to envisage the possibility to amend 
the HNS Convention to add that the right to limit liability would be lost in case of breach of 
safety standards. 
 
Gavin Little51 notices that G. Gauci does not consider the potential scale of damages in 
case of oil or hazardous substances spills. In the case of hazardous substances carriage, 
transportation must be done in bulk, at low expenses and relatively safely. That’s the 
reason why ships are used but it includes a significant level of risks linked to the perils of 
sea. The economic consequences of marine pollution by hazardous or noxious substances 
are potentially serious even for a large shipowning company and its insurers. It is normal 
that they do not want to bear all the risks inherent to such a carriage. 
 
In the case of the HNS Convention, the amounts of limitation are supposed to be high 
enough to cover the majority of incidents. Shipowners will agree to have a high level of 
liability as long as it is insurable. The advantage for them is that there is a predictability of 
                                                   
50 HNSC article 9-2. 
51 Gavin Little, The Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention : a new horizon in the regulation of marine 
pollution, LMCLQ 1998, pp. 558-559. 
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what they are supposed to pay and that they will enjoy a better reputation towards potential 
injured parties. 
 
As a consequence, victims are better protected by the HNS Convention, except in really 
extreme cases, and shipowners are able to insure themselves without unpredictability. It is a 
win-win situation. Introducing an unlimited system of liability with compulsory insurance 
and a ceiling would not improve fundamentally the situation for the victims especially 
since limited liability is extended by financial securities provided by the HNS Fund. 
 
However, it may happen some problems of coordination when the HNS Convention is 
applicable in the same time than other conventions that do not retain the same rules on 
liability. 
 
3.1.4 Case of hybrid accident involving collision and HNS damage 
 
Collision liability is regulated in the “Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of 
Law with Respect to Collision between Vessels”52 (hereafter 1910 Convention). In 
Norwegian law, the 1910 Convention has been transposed in the Chapter 8 of the Maritime 
Code 1994. 
 
The provisions of this chapter are peculiar comparing to the rest of the Maritime Code in 
the way that they consist in a review of all possible case and for each case decide who 
should be liable. The general characteristic is that the liability regime is a liability for fault. 
 
In the HNS Convention, rules on conflict of conventions have been elaborated at article 4. 
Claims must arise out of any contract for the carriage of goods or passengers. They concern 
conflict with laws applicable to workers, pollution damage as defined in the CLC 1969 and 
damage caused by a radioactive material of class 7. 
                                                   
52 Brussels, 23 september 1910. 
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A large number of hypotheses can arise. 
 
3.1.4.1 Collision between two HNS carriers 
 
First, what will happen if two ships transporting hazardous and noxious substances collide? 
 
The HNS Convention has a provision for incidents involving two or more HNS carriers53. 
To be responsible, the owners should not be exempted under article 7. If the requirements 
of article 8 are fulfilled, the owners are liable jointly and severally for all damage that are 
not reasonably separable. 
 
But what kind of damages is covered? If one vessel was transporting passengers and HNS 
cargo, to whom shall they claim compensation? 
As we have seen, the HNS Convention excludes claims arising out of any contract. That 
seems to prevent the passengers of the vessel to claim against the owner of this vessel on 
the ground of the HNS Convention. They should be able to claim against him only on the 
ground of the contract and by extension on the ground of the “Athens Convention relating 
to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974” 54 (hereafter Athens 
Convention 1974). The carrier is liable for his, or the one he is responsible for, fault or 
negligence55. Limitation is up to 175,000 SDR for each passenger except if higher limits 
are agreed between carrier and passengers. 
 
If damage occurs in the scope of article 4, e.g. damage to a worker or to the goods 
transported under contract of carriage, the answer would be the same. 
 
                                                   
53 HNSC 1996 article 8. 
54 In the Norwegian Maritime Code 1994, under chapter 15. 
55 NMC 1994 section 418. 
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However, injured passengers can claim against the registered owner of the other vessel 
carrying hazardous and noxious substances. The problem arises when damages are not 
reasonably separable. Recourse action is provided by article 8-3. If a passenger claims 
against the owner of the other vessel for compensation of his damage on the ground of the 
HNS Convention, the owner should be able to use his recourse right against the other 
owner involved in the HNS accident. However the HNS Convention seems not to be 
applicable pursuant to article 4. The owner of the passenger/HNS vessel will use the 
defence under the Athens Convention 1974. 
 
3.1.4.2 Case where only one vessel carries hazardous and noxious substances. 
 
Second hypothesis is when only one vessel involved in a collision is carrying hazardous 
and noxious substances. In this case, we are out of the scope of article 8. 
 
The HNS Convention does not deal directly with this situation. However in article 42, the 
HNS Convention holds that it supersede any convention already in force in case of conflict. 
 
A scenario56 is that a chemical tanker of 20 000 GT and a cruise ship of 85 000 GT collide. 
In the collision 5 passengers are killed and 30 are injured. The cruise ship’s bunker tanks 
are breached. The chemical tanker spills some of its cargoes and it causes the death of ten 
more passengers. 
 
For the damages caused by the spill of chemical, the HNS Convention would be applicable 
including for the death of the passengers as the passengers did not contract with the 
shipowner. 
The shipowner will be able to limit his liability at 37 millions SDR (10 million for the first 
level + 18 000 x 15000 for the second level). 
                                                   
56 This scenario was provided by Joe Nichols, Workshop 25 and 26 May 2006, IMO London. 
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If the damages are more important that this amount, the HNS Fund will have to pay under 
article 14-5. The total compensation received by the aggrieved parties will be limited up to 
250 million SDR. As a consequence the Fund will provide 213 million SDR (250 million – 
37 million). 
 
We do not take into consideration that the spill of chemicals is the consequence of the 
collision. Normally, if the collision was caused by both ships, each vessel would cover the 
damage in proportion to its fault57. In case both ships are equally liable, the cruise ship 
would have to cover half of the damages occurred by the spill of chemicals. A more 
extreme case would be that the cruise ship is the only one to be at fault for the collision and 
as such has to pay for all the damages. This situation would be unsatisfactory. First of all, 
transporting hazardous and noxious goods is a risky enterprise. The carriers who benefit 
from this activity should be the one to bear the associated risks. As seen previously, it is not 
a system of liability based on blameworthy conduct but on risks. The cruise ship has no 
mean to know in advance what could be the consequence of a collision. Furthermore, the 
carrier is the person who is in the best position to take adequate insurance. However, article 
8-3 enables the HNS shipowner to claim against the other owner in a recourse action. 
 
For the first damages that are the direct consequences of the collision, the 1910 Convention 
would apply as well as the Bunker Oil Convention when in force, the CLC/Fund 
Convention and the Athens Convention58. 
 
Cases of collision involving one HNS carrier and another type of vessel happened several 
times59. On 31st January 2006, the ECE sank after colliding with another vessel near the 
coats of France. It transported around 10,000 tonnes of phosphoric acid and 90 tonnes of 
                                                   
57 NMC 1994 section 161. 
58 For a concrete example of collision between a cruise ship and a container vessel, in 1999, the Ever Decent 
transporting cyanide and other hazardous substances collided with the Norwegian Dream, carrying 1750 passengers 
and 638 crew members. Substantial physical damage to both vessels arose including a fire onboard of the Ever 
Decent, but no major injuries.  
59 See, for instance, the Happy Fellow (1995), the Ichiyo Maru No21 (1997), the Allegra (1997), Qi Yun 881 
(1999), the Martina (2000), the Tasei Maru (2000), the Formosa One (2001), the Dutch Aquamarine (2001), the 
Freja Asia (2002), the Kasco (2005), the Samho Brother (2005). 
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propulsion fuel. Phosphoric acid represents a low degree of danger for the environment. 
However damages as defined pursuant to article 1-6 shall be covered by the rules of the 
HNS Convention. 
 
 
To conclude, the liability system under the HNS Convention is now classical for the 
maritime society. Even though it constitutes a supplementary financial burden for the 
shipowners, whose liability has increased, it is today welcomed by them, as long as their 
liability is insurable. Criticisms to this system are not peculiar to the Convention. It is 
natural that not every country is fully satisfied with an international convention. The HNS 
Convention is the result of a compromise in which each State Party finds a benefit even if it 
is counterbalanced by some detriments. So in itself, the liability system does not constitute 
a real hindrance to the adoption of the HNS Convention.  
 
3.2 Compulsory insurance 
 
The HNS Convention Article 12 imposes compulsory insurance on the registered 
shipowner. It gives the choice between insurance and other financial security provided for 
example by a bank. It seems to be the same obligation than under the CLC 1992 article 760. 
Victims will have a right of direct action against the insurer that cannot assert defences 
issued from the insurance policy but can assert the ones available for the insured. 
 
The significance of the issue of insurance is shown by the fact that the negotiations in 1984 
failed partly because insurers refused to provide insurance for the HNS risk. This refusal 
can be explained by the fact that we still do not know about the actual harmful effect of 
70% sold chemical product.  
 
                                                   
60 NMC 1994 section 191. 
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3.2.1 Scope of application of article 12  
 
3.2.1.1 Limited scope pursuant to the size of the ship 
 
Article 12 does not provide any exemption according the type or size of ship. It is a 
difference with CLC 1992 which stipulates that there is no obligation to subscribe 
insurance under a minimum of 2,000 tonnes of oil as cargo in bulk. This minimum does not 
exist in the HNS Convention. The first paragraph only refers to ships carrying hazardous 
and noxious substances. Neither does the limitation of liability provide a minimum. Shall 
every ship be insured as every ship will carry some materials that are covered by the HNS 
Convention? Even in the definition, there is neither minimum quantity under which the 
HNS Convention is not applicable nor any requirements about the reasons why the 
substance is on board. Must it be cargo transported from one port to another or product 
used for the maintenance of the vessel? As a consequence, it will be seldom that a 
shipowner will not have to cover himself for HNS risks. 
 
However, if there is no general exemption for the non application of the Convention, each 
State can decide that the HNS Convention as a whole will not be applicable to ships whose 
gross tonnage is inferior to 200 GT and carrying dangerous goods in package form when 
they are involved in domestic transport or if an agreement exists between two neighbouring 
States for sea carriage between them61. 
 
This exemption has a restricted scope but it answers to criticisms, as seen previously, and 
protects very small shipowners who should not have to support a too heavy financial 
burden in paying compulsory insurance fees. 
 
                                                   
61 HNSC article 5-1 and 5-2. 
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3.2.1.2 Limited scope pursuant to the owner of the ship 
 
Under article 4.4, the Convention does not apply to warships, naval auxiliary or other ships 
owned or operated by a state and used only on non-commercial service. As a consequence 
they are not obliged to comply with the requirements of compulsory insurance. 
 
However a State can decide to apply the Convention to its warships and others pursuant to 
article 4.5. In that case requirements for mandatory insurance are applicable. 
 
3.2.2 Necessity to have compulsory insurance 
 
Even if it is rare that owners do not have sufficient financial security to cover their 
liabilities, the maritime society was not willing to take this risk. Indeed, in the absence of 
compulsory insurance requirements, the shipowner is free to take a cover for one or another 
type of liabilities. Mandatory insurance has the advantage to at least ensure compensation 
to pollution victims. 
 
The disadvantage of compulsory insurance is that it creates discrepancy in competition. 
First, a shipowner may not be able to purchase insurance. It is common that insurer uses 
different insurance rates to take into account of the higher risks of substandard ships. In a 
way, this politicy encourages their member shipowners to reduce or avoid pollution 
incidents. They will also be required to maintain their class through the insured period. It is 
particularly important to counterbalance the “moral hazard”. When an operator is insured, 
his behaviour is different from the situation he is not. He will act naturally less carefully 
regarding prevention. 
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Secondly, considering the international nature of maritime transportation, without uniform 
rules, shipowners would have to comply with different more or less permissive national 
laws which would create competition issues. Then it is necessary to create a uniform 
system of compulsory insurance. 
 
The last remaining competition issue is when a ship is registered in a State that is not party 
to the HNS Convention. Article 12-1 does not require from ships registered in a non-
member country to purchase a compulsory insurance. However article 12-2 stipulates that 
any State Party can issue a certificate for those vessels. Those two articles seem 
contradictory. If a vessel is not required to get insurance why should it have certificates 
proving that it complies with the requirements of the issuing country? Is there an implied 
obligation for a vessel registered in a non-member State to provide sufficient security when 
she enters the seas of a State Party?  
 
Article 12-1 prevents to widen the scope of the HNS Convention to States where it would 
not have been ratified. However, if a vessel not registered in a State Party causes an HNS 
incident in the territorial sea of a State Party, the HNS Convention will be applicable62. The 
strict liability of the registered shipowner will be retained and the limitation threshold will 
be higher than normally. It is probably advisable for the shipowner willing to conduct 
regular carriage by sea of hazardous and noxious goods in State Party waters to take 
sufficient security against his potential liability. If he freely secures himself, article 12-2 
will be applicable and certificates will be issued. If the shipowner cannot produce 
certificates, the access to the port may be denied. Furthermore, he will be obliged to pay 
fines and penalties in the State Party where the vessel will arrive or leave the port. 
 
However, if he does not take securities, and is unable to pay, the HNS Fund will substitute 
himself to the shipowner pursuant to article 14-1 b). 
                                                   
62 HNSC article 3. 
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3.2.3 Issuance of certificates 
 
The aim of the HNS Convention is to provide adequate compensation with a short notice. 
Not to restrict too much the way that compensation is secured, HNS Convention, CLC 
1992 and Bunker Oil Convention allow maintaining other financial security than insurance. 
It can take the form of a guarantee from a bank or any similar institution as long as security 
is financially adequate. 
 
Most of the time, the security will take the form of a blue card issued by a P&I Club. 
Certificate must be issued for each ship after a State Party has checked that financial 
security was sufficient. If the vessel is not registered in a State Party, the appropriate 
authority of any State Party may issue and certify a certificate63. 
 
Due to the variety of securities, it is necessary that State parties recognise certificates 
issued in other countries otherwise there would be a conflict in the recognition of 
administrative decisions taken by another member State. It enables to ensure comity 
between States Parties. Such an obligation is made under article 12-7. However a State may 
at any time request consultation with the issuing or certifying State if it believes that the 
guarantor or insurer is not financially capable of meeting his obligations. Furthermore, a 
State Party is not obliged to accept a certificate in case the same recognising State would 
not have issued one for its on vessel. For instance, a State may revoke its own certificates 
and therefore it may refuse to accept certificates issued by other States Parties under the 
same circumstances. This possibility is made to ensure that no better treatment is given to 
foreign vessels comparing to domestic vessels. 
 
                                                   
63 HNSC article 12-2. 
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To ease cooperation between States, the HNS Convention utilizes flag State control at a 
first stage64. The State Party where the vessel is flagged must verify the existence of 
certificates. At a second stage, member State would ascertain that such a security has been 
taken by each vessel, even registered in a non-member State, entering or leaving the 
territorial sea of the State. In practice, a State Party relies on the monitoring system of the 
country where the blue card provider has its principal place of business. If this country is 
not a party to the HNS Convention, it would be inappropriate and even against its duties for 
the States Parties to grant such a trust. 
 
Most States that are already party to the CLC have a procedure for issuing and monitoring 
the validity of certificates. They have a system of penalties in case a vessel failed to 
provide enough security. In United Kingdom, under CLC, it is considered as an offence for 
a ship to enter or leave a domestic port or terminal without an insurance certificate issued 
by a State Party. 
 
The HNS Convention gives little guidance as to the criteria regarding to the evaluation of 
the blue cards. Article 12, paragraph 1 establishes that the financial guarantees must be as 
reliable as a bank guarantee and paragraph 7 gives a State Party the right of consultation if 
it believes that the guarantor or insurer is financially unsound.  
 
Pursuant to paragraph 6, States Parties are free to elaborate further national criteria in 
addition to those included in the HNS Convention. It is necessary for each State to rely on 
the foreign national criteria for issuance and validity of compulsory insurance certificate65. 
In the EU and EEA, States must rely on the supervision system of EU and EEA States 
where insurers are licensed66 and cannot require prior approval of policy conditions. 
                                                   
64 HNSC article 12-10. 
65 HNSC article 12-6. 
66 Treaty of Rome articles 59 and seq. and EEA Agreement articles 36 and seq. provides freedom to render 
insurance services. Council Directive 73/239/EEC article 13 amended by Council Directive 92/49/EEC article 9, 
stipulates that the “sole responsibility of the home member State” is supervision. 
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Otherwise they will go against free movement of services. However, prior notification of 
the insurance terms in case of compulsory insurance can be asked67. 
3.2.4 Direct action right 
 
Under the CLC 1992, Bunker Oil Convention, and HNS Convention, a right of direct 
action is given to the victims against the insurer or the guarantor68. It is a mean to avoid 
long proceedings and useless expenses. 
 
The phrase “any claim” is broad enough to include claims from the shipowner for costs for 
preventive measures taken in order to avoid pollution. Costs for preventive measures are 
included in the definition of damage69. But as the shipowner is party of the insurance 
contract so he will exercise his right coming from the insurance policy.  
 
The insurer has a limited scope of defences but in any case, his exposure cannot exceed 
limits under article 9 even if the shipowner is not entitled to limitation. The HNS 
Convention avoids the “paid to be paid” principles, usually found in P&I Insurances. The 
insurer can evoke defences that the shipowner would have had, except the case of 
insolvency. The insurer can assert the wilful misconduct of the owner to avoid payment. 
 
The first question is to determine what a “wilful misconduct” means. The definition varies 
from country to country. 
 
In England, “wilful misconduct” means  
“misconduct to which the will is party as contradistinguished from accident, and is 
far beyond any negligence, even gross or culpable negligence, and involves that a 
person wilfully misconducts himself who knows and appreciates that it is wrong 
                                                   
67 Council Directive 94/49/EEC article 30-2. 
68 HNSC article 12-8, CLC article 7-8 and Bunker Oil Convention article 7-10. 
69 HNSC article 1- 6 (d).  
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conduct on his part in the existing circumstances to do, or to fail or omit to do it, or 
persists in the act, failure or omission regardless of consequences”70. 
 
In France, it will be nearly synonym of dol committed by the shipowner or his part or on 
the part of his servants or agent but it includes on the top “a reckless act or omission with 
the knowledge, sometimes implied, that harm will occur”. 
 
A general answer should be to conclude that “wilful misconduct” corresponds with the 
article 4 of the 1976 LLMC: “act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, 
or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.” 
 
The second interrogation concerns the identification of the person who wilfully 
misconducts himself. Is it the shipowner only or is it possible to extend the exemption 
when the blameworthy behaviour is attributable to the employees or agent of the 
shipowner? It seems that in case of pollution damages, it is preferable to limit the 
identification of the shipowner to the registered owner, the bareboat charterer, the manager 
and the operator. 
 
If the insurer can assert a mean of defence, the damages would be entirely compensated by 
the HNS Fund. 
 
 
In brief, compulsory insurance requirements produce some difficulties that have slowed 
down the adoption of the HNS Convention: competition issues, recognition by States and 
capacity of the insurance market… The Convention solved most of these problems and 
practice should overcome the remaining ones. 
 
                                                   
70 Forder v. Great Western Railway Company, [1905] 2 K.B. 532, p535. 
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3.3 HNS Fund 
 
The HNS Fund is said to operate in a similar way as the IOPC Fund. It indeed assesses 
payment of claims for compensation (3.3.1), receive reports of contributing cargo and 
levies contributions (3.3.2 and 3.3.3). But it will cover more than pollution damages in 
opposition with the IOPC Fund and the compensation system is more complicated. The 
LNG account obeys to special rules comparing to the other accounts and the IOPC Fund 
(3.3.4).  
 
3.3.1 The compensation system 
 
Under Chapter III, the HNS Convention establishes a HNS Fund, which is based on the 
1992 IOPC Fund. It is to compensate the innocent victims of pollution that cannot be 
compensated because the shipowner is exempted of liability, is financially incapable to 
meet his obligations, or the damage exceeds the limits of liability71. When the shipowner is 
unknown, the Fund will be liable as well. 
 
3.3.1.1 Obligation of compensation and exemptions 
 
In the latter case, the existence of the Fund ameliorates significantly the situation as it is 
today where the States have to indemnify victims or even worth where damages to the 
victims remain uncompensated. However, the Fund does not have to pay when it is not 
shown with “reasonable probability” that pollution comes from a ship. 
 
When the shipowner is financially incapable to meet his obligations under the HNS 
Convention, the starting point is that the mandatory insurance will provide for 
                                                   
71 HNSC article 13-1 and 14-1. 
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compensation. However, if the taken financial securities were not sufficient to satisfy the 
claim, the HNS Fund will have to pay.  
 
We can imagine also a scenario where the shipowner is financially incapable and where the 
incident causing damage was provoked by his wilful misconduct. Under article 9-2, the 
shipowner is not entitled to limit his liability but he is unable to pay. Under article 12-8, the 
insurer is exempted in case of wilful misconduct. As a consequence, the HNS Fund 
remains the final payer. It acts as a guarantor that will compensate the victims. In a way, 
victims have a credit of compensation and either the shipowner, the insurer or the HNS 
Fund will indemnify them. 
 
In practice when the compensation exceeds the limits of liability of the shipowner, the 
IOPC Fund settles claim before a court decision confirms that the shipowner is able to limit 
his liability. It is likely that the HNS Fund will follow the same proceedings. 
 
The only mean of exemption for the Fund is provided in articles 14-3 and 4. Once again, if 
damages have been caused by “act of war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection or was 
caused by hazardous and noxious substances which had escaped from a warship” and when 
there is no “reasonable probability” that the pollution resulted from a ship, no payment 
from the Fund can be required. Contributory negligence of the victims enables the Fund to 
be partly or wholly exonerated from payment. 
 
Exemptions for the Fund have a narrower scope than exemptions for the shipowner. It is 
relevant to determine what would happen in case of terrorism. 
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3.3.1.2 Identification of contributors 
 
The amount payable by the Fund must not exceed 250 million SDR minus the amount 
claimed from the shipowner72. 
 
Contributors to the HNS Fund are designated by the “receiver-payer” principle. The 
receiver is responsible as a guarantor because the user of the hazardous and noxious 
substances must be associated when a damage connected to carriage of such substances 
occurs. The analogy with the oil industry is not possible. Indeed, the oil industry does not 
encompasse as many operators and entities as the chemical industry that counts up to 
several thousands of firms. Products are different aspects and the whole capacity of the 
ships is not used only for their carriage. It is difficult to identify shippers and, as a 
consequence, receivers have been made responsible to contribute to the HNS Fund. 
 
A major difference with the 1992 Fund is that the system of contributions to the HNS Fund 
is more complicated. 
 
3.3.2 Contributions to the HNS Fund. 
 
The Fund shows through its original structure the variety of hazardous and noxious 
substances. Oil pollution involves a unique product to be the cause of damage. HNS 
Convention deals with a variety of substances whose characteristics are completely 
different. That is the reason why the HNS Convention introduces several accounts. 
                                                   
72 HNSC article14-5. 
 42
 
Contributions made to the Fund are assigned to four accounts: a general account73 and three 
separate accounts74.  There is no link between definition of hazardous and noxious 
substances and the accounts or sectors they belong to. Contributions are made by entities 
that receive a certain minimum quantity of HNS cargo during the preceding calendar year. 
 
The goal of introducing separate accounts was to avoid cross-subsiding compensation from 
different types of industry. Each industry, id est chemical, LNG, LPG and crude oil, have a 
different safety record. For example, due to researches done in the sector of transportation 
of LNG, this sector improves a higher degree of safety. It would be unfair that the LNG 
industry has to contribute more because of the other sectors. In the same time it enables to 
make entities of each branch more responsible. It is an incitement to obey standards of 
safety in order to reduce the probability of incidents involving cargoes of their sector. 
 
Before separate accounts can enter into operation, contributing cargo must exceed 350 
million tonnes for the oil account, 20 million tonnes for the LNG account and 15 million 
for the LPG account75. Initial contributions requirements do not exist under the 1992 Fund. 
 
Annual contributions to the general account shall be made by persons in a State Party who 
received the preceding year an aggregate amount of 20,000 tonnes of contributing cargo76. 
The minimum of 20,000 tonnes may be considered to be low considering that a large 
number of companies, even of medium size, will be subject to contribution to the Fund. 
Companies will consider the risk of contribution as a heavy burden, even heavier than the 
one borne by shipowners since fewer exemptions are available for the Fund. 
 
The general account is divided into at least two sectors: solid bulk materials and other 
substances. Contributions are distributed amongst the sectors of the general account 
                                                   
73 HNSC article 16-1. 
74 HNSC  article 16-2. 
75 HNSC article 19-3. 
76 HNSC article 18-1. 
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according to the relative risks presented by each sector in order to minimize any cross-
subsidisation. 
 
Annual contributions to the separate account shall be made: 
- in the case of oil77, by persons who received either (i) 150,000 tonnes of 
contributing oil defined in article 1-3 or (ii) 20,000 tonnes of other oils. 
- in the case of LNG78, by persons who has title to LNG cargo at the port of discharge 
when it is the port of a State Party whatever quantity amount. 
- in the case of LPG79, by persons who received 20,000 tonnes of LPG. 
 
Suspension of the operations of a separate account may be decided by the Assembly under 
the circumstances exposed in article 19-4. The Assembly may also reinstate the operation 
of a separate account under article 19-5. When the accounts are suspended, a new separate 
sector will be formed in the general account.  
 
It has been said that the threshold for LNG and LPG80 will not be reached at the entry into 
force of the HNS Convention and, as a consequence, the establishment of a separate 
account will be delayed under article 19-3. Only the oil account will be in activity.  
 
Contrary to the IOPC Fund, only one type of contributions exists under the HNS 
Convention, and it covers administrative expenses and claims for compensation.  
 
3.3.3 States duties: contributions reporting 
 
HNS Convention requires the States to monitor and report the movement of HNS cargoes. 
A correct reporting is essential for the success of the HNS Convention. This obligation 
                                                   
77 HNSC article 19-1 (a). 
78 HNSC article 19-1 (b). 
79 HNSC  article 19-1 (c). 
80 HNSC article 19-3 (b) and (c). 
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implies that States set up administrative machinery manned by highly paid civil servants 
and consequently costs will be significant. States will be more reluctant to ratify the HNS 
Convention than if the costs were born by the HNS industry. 
 
Before the Convention enters into force, but after ratification, the State party must submit 
the relevant quantities of contributing cargo received or discharged for LNG during the 
preceding calendar year81. It does not require reporting the list of individual receivers with 
the quantity each one receives. At that time, States must also implement a national 
reporting scheme for the establishment of a reporting system. 
 
After the implementation of the HNS Convention, States will have to make more details 
reports including the list of individual contributors, quantities of cargo received by each. If 
a member State neglects to report to the Director in time the list of receivers, the Assembly 
shall decide if a compensation for such a loss shall be due by the State Party. 
 
Two solutions were available for the State Parties. They could decide between spot 
verification of reports done by the industry or acting as a police State which is 
administratively more complex and expensive. It would be interesting that member States 
coordinate themselves to achieve a uniform reporting system. The most practical solution is 
that contributors report to States and States report to the HNS Fund. In this way, part of the 
costs would be supported by the industry. After entry into force, the HNS Fund will be able 
to issue invoices to contributors. 
 
To help contributing cargo receivers and States Parties to fulfil their reporting obligation by 
collecting data from individual receivers, the HNS Convention Contributing Cargo 
Calculator has been designed. This database facilitates to determine if substances are in the 
scope of application of the HNS Convention. 
                                                   
81 HNSC article 43. 
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3.3.4 The LNG issue 
 
The HNS Convention holds, as seen previously, different rules for the LNG account 
comparing to the others accounts and other liability conventions. The contributor is not the 
receiver but the titleholder at the port or terminal of discharge. The LNG industry differs 
from the other industries covered by the HNS Convention by its high level of safety 
achieved through long and costly researches. The market is developing rapidly. LNG is 
loaded onto special LNG carriers at liquefaction plants and discharged into regasification 
terminals. There are only 46 import terminals in the world. LNG cargoes are mainly sold 
under long-term contracts in order to provide securities.  
 
The titleholder is the person who has to contribute to the HNS Fund. But the identity of the 
titleholder depends on the type of contract governing the sale of LNG. If the LNG is sold 
‘Cost and insurance freight’ (CIF) or ‘free on board’ (FOB), the importer-buyer will be the 
contributing party. However, most of the contracts of sales is ‘delivered ex ship’ (DEX) 
and the titleholder is the seller.  
 
Contracts of sale are most of the time long-term contracts and when they have been 
negotiated, the financial costs linked with the participation to the HNS Fund were not taken 
into consideration. The seller cannot increase prices either for competition reasons. Indeed, 
the LNG producers are in competition with other producers that can be not subject to the 
HNS Convention. For instance, a Norwegian producer of LNG sells his production ex ship 
in Spain. Spain and Norway will normally be parties to the HNS Convention in 2008. As 
the port of discharge is one of the member countries, the rule of titleholder is applicable. 
That means that the Norwegian producer will have the obligation to report and participate 
to the HNS Fund. If an Algerian82 producer is also exporting LNG to Spain, he is normally 
subject to the same obligation to contribute to the LNG account. However, contributions 
                                                   
82 We will consider that Algeria has not ratified the HNS Convention. 
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may not be collectable from States not party to the Convention since these States may not 
recognise the claims from the HNS Fund as enforceable. States Parties producers have to 
support unfair costs comparing to producers from other countries. 
 
A solution to the problem of non collectable contributions is that the LNG industry requests 
from the contributors a security as a condition of discharge. The government may also 
require security as an “appropriate measure” to make the HNS Convention effective 
according to article 6. 
 
Another issue that concerns all kinds of contributors is the impact of terrorist attacks. 
 
3.3.5 Case of terrorism 
 
Marine insurers fear that terrorists may use ship as a weapon after hijacking. A vessel 
transporting dangerous goods can be an easy target for terrorism83. Consequential impacts 
can be huge on society in term of loss of human lives. For example, a gas tanker colliding 
in a port like Shanghai or Dubai would be a real weapon for terrorists. Other accidents 
involving the transport of hazardous substances may easily be imagined.  
 
How would the HNS Convention be applicable in this case? 
 
3.3.5.1 Definition of terrorism 
 
A problem of definition arises. All definitions of terrorism ultimately tend to go further 
than intended. Does a Greenpeace attack that turns wrong become an act of terrorism? It is 
also difficult to distinguish terrorism from war and other political risks or from other 
criminal acts. 
                                                   
83 As shown by the terrorist attack on the French tanker Limburg in October 2002, close to the Yemen. 
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Under French law, the Penal Code gives a definition of acts of terrorism: “the following 
offences constitute acts of terrorism where they are committed intentionally in connection 
with an individual or collective undertaking the purpose of which is seriously to disturb 
public order by means of intimidation or terror”84. 
 
This definition has prevented the Court to accept compensation by a national fund to 
victims of a bomb explosion, happened in Corsica. The rationale of the precedent was that 
the Code Pénal requires a minimum of organisation and in the case, the bomb constituted 
an isolated act85. 
 
3.3.5.2 Treatment of terrorism by the HNS Convention 
 
Under article 7-2 (b), a cause of exemption of strict liability is when “the damage was 
wholly caused by an act or omission done with the intent to cause damage by a third party”. 
This exemption is the same that the one found in CLC 1992 article 3-2 (b) and Bunker Oil 
Convention article 3-3 (b). Even if terrorism is not directly named as a cause of exemption, 
we consider that this definition aims cases of terrorism. 
 
The absence of strict liability of the shipowner can be explained by the impact it would 
have on compulsory insurance. It is problematic to oblige shipowners to purchase coverage 
for this risk as P&I Clubs have indicated that the Clubs themselves are unable to obtain 
suitable cover from their underwriters in relation to terrorism. 
 
As a consequence, in case of terrorism, shipowner will not be strictly liable but liability for 
negligence can be sought for. This can happen when a shipowner is found liable for failure 
to implement proper measures against terrorism. He has to show that he exercised due care 
                                                   
84 Code Pénal article 421-1. 
85 Cass. Civ. 1re, 17 October 1995, [1996] RCA no.72. 
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when controlling the activities of people aboard. For example, the shipowner must ensure 
that he limited the access to the ship. He must control passengers and employees. 
 
Under article 1486, a similar exemption than article 7-2 (b) cannot be found. The HNS Fund 
has to pay compensation except when “act of war and hostilities”. Can “act of war and 
hostilities” be assimilated by extension to terrorism? The two situations are close as shown 
by the fact that the civil victims of both events are treated the same way under French 
Law87. However, if the intent of the HNS Convention was to exclude terrorism from the 
HNS Fund’s scope of obligation to indemnify victims, it will have use the same wording 
than in article 7. We can conclude that the HNS Fund will remain liable. 
 
Terrorism can be considered as an event constituting a force majeure case. In a French 
decision of 199788, it was decided that an irresistible event constitutes in itself force 
majeure, where its effect may not be prevented despite foreseeable character, in 
circumstances where the carrier took all the requested steps to avoid the occurrence of the 
event. However, force majeure is not a mean of defence available for the Fund. It is not 
included in the exhaustive list of article 14-3. Third parties, victims of terrorist attacks, can 
claim against the HNS Fund. 
 
Moreover some countries have introduced a system of compensation for victims. In France, 
a Compensation Fund, created by a law of 9 September 1986, provides full compensation 
for physical injury and mental suffering. This Compensation Fund indemnifies French 
victims of a terrorist attacks in France or abroad and foreigners for attacks on French 
territory. As an exception to French law principles, the Compensation Fund must pay 
compensation even though the terrorists have been identified and prosecuted. It fulfils a 
national duty of solidarity89. However, the Compensation Fund by subrogation to the 
                                                   
86 HNSC article 14 is based on the Fund Convention 1971/1992, article 4-2. 
87 Law of 6 July 1990, article 26. Victims of terrorism are granted the status of civil victims of war (victimes civiles 
de guerre). It includes free medical care and the benefit of a pension in addition to compensation. 
88 Cass. Com., 1st October 1997, [1997] D. Affaires 1217, no37. 
89 Cf. Court of Appeal of Paris, 24 June 1992, Gazette du Palais, no. 318-319 of 13-14 November 1992. 
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victims is entitled to recover what it has paid90. It is conceivable to see the Compensation 
Fund claiming against the HNS Fund. 
 
 
The HNS Fund is complex and constitutes a heavy burden for the cargo owners and 
especially for the LNG producers. States also have their share of duties which generates 
extra administrative costs. But, solutions have been found to minimize those issues so that 
no more major problems prevent enactment of the HNS Convention nowadays. However 
there might be some formal and procedural hindrances that are inherent to each country. 
We will analyse the cases of two main potential participants to the HNS Convention. 
                                                   
90 Cass. Crim., 20 October 1993, [1994] D. , 280, note Anne d’Hauteville. 
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4. Two examples of difficulties of ratification 
 
To date, the HNS Convention has been ratified by Russia, Angola, Morocco, Cyprus, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Slovenia and Tonga. The European Union (EU) plans to ratify it 
with the package “Erika 3” in 2008. The importance of adopting an international tool in 
matter of HNS pollution has always been recognized by the EU but difficulties in the 
process of ratification took place (4.1). On the contrary, the United States adopted 
unilateralist behaviour by implementing their own legislation with CERCLA (4.2). 
 
4.1  European Union: the incompatibility between the HNS convention and 
Regulation 44/2001 
 
In spite of the signature of the HNS Convention by Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, no EU country has yet ratified it. Nevertheless, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom have begun to take steps towards ratification. This delay 
from the EU is the result of legal and jurisdictional problems. Articles 38 to 40 of the HNS 
Convention stipulate specific jurisdictional and enforcement rules that are directly in 
conflict with rules contained in R44/2001 (4.1.1). However this conflict has been settled by 
the adoption of the Council Decision 02/971/EC91 (4.1.2). 
                                                   
91 Council Decision 02/971/EC, 2002 OJ (L 337/55). 
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4.1.1 Overview of the conflict with EC Law 
 
On specific matters, the EU has an exclusive competence over areas that are also regulated 
by the HNS Convention. EC law has established a system of judicial cooperation between 
member States. A major tool of this system is the rules on jurisdiction of European courts, 
litis pendens and mutual recognition of judgments. These rules are included in the 
Regulation Brussels 1, R44/2001. When an international convention contains rules in 
contradiction with R44/2001, EU member States are not allowed to ratify such a 
convention. Most of the time, maritime liability conventions include provisions on 
competent jurisdiction and recognition of judgments. Article 38 of the HNS Convention 
provides jurisdiction to the State Party where the damage occurs or if it occurs outside the 
territory of a State Party, to the State Party where the ship is registered or flagged, where 
the owner has his usual residence or where the fund has been constituted. 
 
R44/2001, article 2 gives jurisdiction to the Courts of the State where the defendant has his 
habitual residence and article 5-3 makes competent the Courts of the State where the 
harmful event occurred. EU is concerned by the fact that a lack of vigilance may lead to a 
gradual break-up of the common rules. Individual ratification by member States, outside 
the EU’s control, endangers the uniform application of R44/2001. 
 
Due to the EU’s exclusive competence, it is presumed that the Community should ratify 
itself convention that includes provisions on matters involving exclusive Community 
competence. The HNS Convention is a mixed convention that includes matters of 
Community’s competence and matters of member States’ competence. The practice tends 
to show that it is better to have a co-ordinate and joint conclusion of mixed agreements by 
the Community, and its member States. Unfortunately, the HNS Convention has no 
accession clause entitling the European Union as a regional organisation to directly ratify 
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it92. It is therefore preferable that every member States ratified the HNS Convention jointly 
and simultaneously. 
 
4.1.2 Council Decision 02/971/EC 
 
The ratification of the HNS Convention is highly desirable. For that reason, the Council of 
the European Union authorises the member States to ratify or accede to it with 
reservation93. The member States are still subject to the rules on recognition and 
enforcement of judgments contains in Regulation 44/2001. 
 
In the first article of the Council decision, confirmed by the second article, a hierarchy 
between Community Law and the HNS Convention is settled. The HNS Convention can be 
ratified only to the extent that it is not in contradiction with matters that are under the 
Community exclusive competence. Article 2 gives a guideline of the way to make a 
reservation. member States remain subject to rules on recognition of judgements contained 
in R 44/2001. 
 
However, a doubt is created by the wording of article 2. It is not clear that “declaration” 
shall be considered as a reservation with legal consequences. If it is a mere declaratory 
statement, it may not have the force of law. In my opinion, it should be considered as a 
reservation making applicable EC rules on recognition of judgments which is confirmed by 
the obligation for member States to notify that the ratification “has taken place in 
accordance with [the] Decision.”94. 
 
A question that remains unclear is to know whether or not provisions about the competent 
jurisdiction included in the HNS Convention will be applicable to member States. There is 
                                                   
92 For example, a clause permitting ratification by a regional organisation has been inserted in the 2002 Protocol to 
tha 1974 Athens Convention, article 19-1. 
93 Decision 2002/971/EC point (7). 
94 Decision 2002/971/EC article 7. 
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no requirement to make a reservation on that matter. However ratification should not 
“prejudice to existing European Community competence” and be made in “the interest of 
the Community”. Two interests are in conflict: the integration in EC law of a necessary 
liability regime and the protection of a uniform set of procedural rules.  
 
No requirements for simultaneous ratification by member States were made as well. It was 
only supposed to be done before the 30 June 2006. However in the project of report on the 
proposition of the directive on the civil liability and financial guarantees of shipowners 
dated on 31 August 2006, it was stated that it is proposed to member States to ratify the 
HNS Convention in the same time than the directive and to introduce it in EC Law. It 
should be a part of the third maritime safety package.  
 
The will of the Community to participate in the HNS Convention is mentionned at two 
occasions. Firstly, article 1 stipulates that the ratification of the HNS Convention must be 
done by member States but “in the interest of the Community”.  Secondly, article 5 shows 
the wish that “the Community [becomes] a contracting party” to the HNS Convention. 
 
In conclusion, the Decision 2002/971/EC is not completely clear on the procedural aspects 
that should be adopted when the member States will ratify the HNS Convention. 
Nevertheless, the will to ratify and to implement it in a near future has overcome on the 
procedural EC rules.  
  
Ratification by member States of the European Union is an important step for the success 
of the Convention. The most numerous countries with a significant fleet adopt it, the best it 
is for the uniformity and predictability of the rules governing maritime society. To that 
goal, it would be even better it the United States ratified the HNS Convention. At that 
point, the main issue is not insurmountable as well: it consists in the unilateralist policy of 
the United States. 
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4.2 United States: the unilateralist standpoint with CERCLA 
 
The United States have adopted with respect to oil spills from vessels, their own 
legislation. Concerning the HNS Convention, even if it remains legally and politically 
rooms for ratification, the United States have already adopted their proper rules. A system 
of liability applicable to release of hazardous substances from a vessel already exists: the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (thereafter FWPCA) and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (thereafter (CERCLA). 
CERCLA is the main piece of legislation and we will limit our study to compare it with the 
HNS Convention. 
 
4.2.1 Comparison between CERCLA and the HNS Convention 
 
Originally, CERCLA was designed to deal with the environmental consequences of the 
disposal of hazardous substances at onshore waste disposals but it is also applicable to 
substances released95 from vessels. The primary liability is borne by the polluter but 
CERCLA also refers to a fund financed by taxes paid by various chemical feedstocks96 to 
compensate those who were not fully compensated by the polluter97. In a way, the 
mechanism is close to the one of the HNS Convention where a first layer is provided by the 
shipowner and a second one by the chemical industry. But the analogy is limited. 
 
Firstly, “hazardous substances” are referred as those listed by the Environmental Protection 
Agency. Even if this covered, many commonly shipped materials, there is a chance that this 
list is not completely overlapping the hazardous and noxious substances covered by the 
                                                   
95 The term 2release or threatened release” is defined to cover a multitude of facts: spilling, leaking, pouring,… 
dumping and disposing into the environment. 42 U.S.C.§9601(22) (1994). 
96 26 U.S.C. §9507 (1994). 
97 42 U.S.C. §9611 (1994). 
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HNS Convention. For instance, crude oil is excluded from CERCLA but is covered by the 
HNS Convention98. 
 
Secondly, CERCLA renders strictly liable for releases four categories of parties. But only 
two are relevant for release from a vessel or facility: the owner and the operator of the 
vessel or facilities99. The HNS Convention only retains the strict liability of the registered 
shipowner. Under CERCLA section 9601 (20) (B) (i) the carrier is solely liable when the 
shipper utilizes a common carrier or contract carrier to transport a hazardous substances 
and under section 9601 (20) (B) (ii) it is conceivable to held the shipper liable for 
negligence. It is the case when the release was at least in part due to circumstances under 
the shipper’s control. 
 
The HNS Convention covers a larger category of damages than CERCLA which is limited 
to the costs incurred by the government and private parties responding to the release and 
damages to natural resources100. Personal injury and death claims and also property 
damages and business losses are not actionable. The scope of application of CERCLA is 
consequently limited in comparison with the one of the HNS Convention. Victims of other 
types of damage must base their claim on other statutes or common law remedies. For 
instance, Jones Act can be actionable for claims from seamen.  
 
CERCLA Section 9607(b) enables the responsible party to be exempted of liability when 
the damage is the result of an act of God, act of war, or an act or omission of a third party 
other than an employee, agent or co-contractor of the defendant. The HNS Convention 
provides the same exemptions but exemptions that are closely related to the activity of 
transport of hazardous goods are added101. 
 
                                                   
98 42 U.S.C. §9601 (14). 
99 42 U.S.C. §9604 (a) (1)-(4). 
100 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (1994). 
101 See 3.1.1.2. 
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Under CERCLA liability is limited to 5,000,000 USD or 300 USD per gross ton, whichever 
is higher when the vessel is carrying hazardous and noxious substances as cargo or 500,000 
USD or 300 USD per gross ton whichever is greater102. Limits of the HNS Convention are 
substantially higher but exceptions to limitation are less numerous. They have both in 
common the wilful misconduct of the responsible party. In addition, no limitation can be 
asked when the release was made in violation of safety regulations or if the responsible 
party failed to provide assistance and cooperation to regulatory agencies. Those exceptions 
to the right of limitation would be helpful in the HNS Convention. It would prevent the 
“moral hazard”. 
 
4.2.2 Application on two cases 
 
Referring to two existing American cases, we will attempt to figure out if the adoption of 
the HNS Convention by the United States would ameliorate their legislation. 
 
4.2.3 The M/V SANTA CLARA I103 
 
In 1992, twenty-one containers were lost overboard from the cargo vessel, M/V Santa Clara 
I, when she encounters a severe storm off the coast of New Jersey. In all, 441 barrels of 
arsenic trioxide were lost. Besides, 800 pounds of magnesium phosphide spilled from 
drums stowed inside one of the cargo holds. It created a dangerous phosphine gas. The 
cargo was not properly designated but the shipper specified that it was a hazardous product 
and paid the hazardous cargo rate.  
 
Costs associated with cleaning up the magnesium were about 2.2 million USD and 
longshoremen claimed for personal injuries against the vessel owner and operator. 
 
                                                   
102 42 U.S.C. §9607(c). 
103 United States v. M/V Santa Clara I, 887 F. Supp, 825, 1996 AMC 910 (D.S.C. 1995). 
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Coast Guard issued an administrative order pursuant to FWCPA section 311(c), CERCLA 
section 9606 (b) and Intervention on the High Seas Act section 5 against the owner and the 
operator to search for, locate and dispose of the barrels. The United States filed also a 
CERCLA action against the shipowner to recover its costs. 
 
The shipowner, seeking for recovery of his costs and expenses, claimed against the shipper 
and the consignee of the arsenic on the ground that they were owner and operator of the 
facilities from which the arsenic licked. He argued that stowage in containers was made 
improperly. The consignee argued that once the shipowner accepted contractually the 
cargo, CERCLA subsection 9601 (20) (B) (i) impose liability solely on the owner and 
operator.  
 
The Court decided, on the one hand, that the common carrier was the CERCLA owner or 
operator, responsible for release that occurs beyond the shipper’s control pursuant to 
section 9601 (20) (B). Consequently, the shipowner was considered to be the responsible 
party. On the second hand, it held that if the shipper or cargo owner failed to comply with 
his duty of care with respect to the shipment of cargo, they would be liable. But this 
requires the Court to undertake a factual determination of the causes and circumstances that 
resulted in the release and whether the release resulted solely from the causes and 
circumstances that were beyond the control of the shipper. In brief, both the shipper and the 
carrier could incur owner and operator liability for the containers “if both contributed to or 
caused a release or threatened release.” The condition of existence of release was fulfilled 
in the present case. So the shipowner was liable under section 9607 (a) (1) and it was 
decided that the shipper failed to comply with government regulations regarding the 
labelling of hazardous cargo but the Court refuse to hold the shipper liable on contract law. 
However, it was impossible to decide in a summary judgment that damages were due to the 
shipper’s negligence without proving the foreseeability in the same time. The shipper’s 
negligent liability was not retained. 
 
Pursuant to the HNS Convention, the solution would have been slightly different. 
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Considering the damages, personal injuries caused by the spill of hazardous substances will 
also be covered by the registered shipowner who will be strictly liable, and his insurer. If 
the total of compensation for all claims is superior to the shipowner’s maximum of liability 
amount, the HNS Fund will supply for the rest up to 250 million SDR.  
 
The main issue would be to know if the shipowner could be exempted of liability under 
section 7-2 (d)104. It is doubtful that the exemption will be held because, even though the 
shipper of the magnesium phosphide concedes that he failed to properly designate the 
goods as hazardous cargo, the shipowner was still aware of the dangerous nature of the 
goods. There is no evidence that the failure to furnish information has caused wholly or 
partly the damage and the shipowner ought to have purchase an insurance policy because 
he knew that the vessel was “actually” carrying a hazardous good. 
 
4.2.4 The M/V NICOLAOS105 
 
A fire broke out aboard the M/V Nicolaos while loading in Georgia. It was caused by the 
spillage of calcium hypochlorite which reacted with some organic material left by the 
stevedores. The cargo was packaged in drums and the warning failed to provide warning to 
the shipowner that contact with grease, oil or other organic material should be avoided.  
The Court held that the shipper’s failure was negligent even if they were not required by 
regulations. But the Court of Appeal requested to consider if the carrier knew about the 
hazardous characteristics of the cargo. 
 
In a similar case governed by the HNS Convention, the question would have been to know 
if article 7-2 (d) was applicable. The actual knowledge of the shipowner is a central 
question under both American rules and the HNS Convention. 
                                                   
104 Cf. 3.1.1.2. 
105 Ionmar Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Central of Georgia R.R. Co., 471 F. Supp, 1979 A.M.C. 1747 (S.D. Ga. 
1979) 
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In conclusion, the HNS Convention contains several advantages comparing to CERCLA 
and the American regime: 
- the responsible party is more easily identifiable, 
- the limitation of liability is in general higher, 
- a larger amount of damages are taken into account, 
- the exemption of liability are less numerous and not easily actionable, 
- the system is unified with only one source of rules. 
All those advantages create predictability. 
 
Ratification of the HNS Convention would significantly improve the American system on 
liability for marine pollution by hazardous and noxious substances. Moreover, it would 
ameliorate the global situation as it is preferable that a maximum of countries ratifies 
liability conventions in order to have a universal harmonized regime. The United States 
passing its own particular legislation creates great inconvenience to the global shipping 
regime. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The HNS Convention should be in force after ratification of EU member States in the 
“third safety package” in 2008. Implementation of the HNS Convention is a positive step 
for several reasons. 
 
Firstly, the HNS Convention is an important instrument for the improvement of the 
environmental protection and the victims’ compensation in case of pollution by hazardous 
and noxious substances. The compensation amounts will be higher than those provided by 
the different national laws. It should be more adequate regarding the potential seriousness 
of HNS accidents. Indeed, the figures of the ceiling of limitation are thought to cover most 
of the cases. Revision mechanism should be available to adjust the amount with normal 
inflation and if it happens that ceilings were not high enough. Proceedings are accelerated 
thanks to the strict liability and the channelling of liability. 
 
Then the HNS Convention fulfils three gaps: 
- It is the complement of other conventions dealing with transport of hazardous 
materials. 
- It is the logical complement of other conventions dealing with marine pollution. 
- It strengthens the preventive rules for this type of pollution. Incitement to obey 
safety measures is higher when a strict system of compensation and sanction is 
settled.  
 
As a consequence, it is advisable that as the largest possible number of countries ratifies the 
HNS Convention. With this aim, ratification by the United States would constitute a real 
incentive to achieve a uniform and global regime. Uniformity enables better recognition of 
judgments and avoids conflict of jurisdiction. Moreover, it is fundamental to avoid getting 
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a patchwork of different national legislations rules when 90 per cent of the world trade is 
carried by sea. 
 
Governments have been aware of the need of implementation of the HNS Convention. But 
criticisms and controversies have slowed down the process of ratification. 
 
Criticisms have concerned both specific points (as for example controversies on the linkage 
of limitation amounts, problems of competition, articulation with other conventions, 
contributions from the LNG industry, case of terrorism) and the essence of the 
compensation system: 
 
- some countries wanted to abolish the principle of limitation of liability for the 
shipowner, 
- the rule of channelling of liability was not unanimously accepted, 
- the insurance industry showed reluctance regarding the market capacity to cover 
the HNS risks, 
- the HNS Fund is more complex than the IOPC Fund due to the diversity of 
goods included in the HNS Convention. 
 
But most of those issues have found a solution nowadays by the establishment of a strict 
liability of the shipowner regime with compulsory insurance and channelling of liability 
and of the HNS Fund. 
 
It is now up to individual States to consider or not their adhesion to the system pursuant to 
their own political opinions. 
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Abbreviations 
 
FOB  Free on board 
FWPCA Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
CIF  Cost and insurance freight 
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
DEX  Delivered ex ship 
CLC  International Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
CMI  Comité Maritime International 
CRTD Convention on Civil liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels 
EC  European Community 
EEA  European Economic Area 
EU  European Union 
GT  Gross tonne 
HNS  Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
HNSC International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 
IMO  International Maritime Organisation 
IOPC  International Oil Pollution Compensation 
LLMC  Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
LPG  Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
NMC  Norwegian Maritime Code 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 B
OPRC-HNS Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents 
by Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
SDR  Special Drawing Rights 
US  United States of America 
USD  American Dollar 
